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The Absence of Democracy in Aboriginal Self-Governance Policy  
 
Gina van den Burg, McMaster University 
 
 
The protracted history of Aboriginal governance policy is ripe with frustrations among First 
Nations peoples and Canadian governments, the most pronounced aggravation being the federal 
government. Substantial resistance from Aboriginals often marks each new policy the 
government introduces. New policies often maintain the paternalistic attitude inherent in 
government initiatives, which has been very difficult for Aboriginal organizations to eradicate. 
Although Aboriginal governance policy is currently progressing towards a quasi-cooperative 
form of policy-making on both sides, this particular policy area continues to encounter 
significant disparities between policy actors within the Canadian government and Aboriginal 
organizations. Differences throughout the entire policy process hinder effective policy-making 
from agenda-setting/problem definition to the outcome/evaluation. 
 This research paper can help explain the reasons behind the continuous failures of such 
government policies and how the living conditions of Aboriginals can be improved through 
recognition of their right to self-determination. First, I will detail the evolution of Aboriginal 
governance policy and the difficulties it is confronted with today. In the second section, I will 
explore the roles and salience of specific policy actors involved in this particular area. An 
analysis of the differing ideologies and policy goals will be outlined in the third section. I will 
makes use of path dependency theory to aid in the explanation for the relatively constant policy 
path that has transpired over the past century. In the fourth section, I will provide methods for 
improving the role of Aboriginals in the policy-making process. Such improvement is important 
for diminishing the often overbearing position of the government in Aboriginal governance 
affairs. I will argue that treaty federalism provides the most reasonable and equitable procedure 
for this case. Lastly, I will describe the primary and secondary sources utilized, followed by a 
brief explanation of their importance in the overall presentation of the paper. 
Aboriginal governance policy can be separated into three different policy fields.
1
 The 
first includes broad yet important policy areas, such as international trade and customs, which 
may affect Aboriginals but are largely ignored in the policy process. The second policy field 
incorporates issues that are central to the interests of Aboriginals, but which only affords them a 
semi-involved role in the consultation and decision-making processes. Such examples are parks 
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and environmental protection. The third and most relevant policy field includes federal and 
provincial policy in relation to specific Aboriginal issues, such as the governments' responses to 
said treaty violations, most especially those pertaining to self-government treaties.
2
 This last 
policy field has remained one of the more constant issues on the agendas of First Nations; 
however, only within the last three decades has self-government for Aboriginals been on the 
federal government’s agenda. 
 
I: Policy Continuity 
Understanding the evolution of Aboriginal policy is of the utmost importance since almost every 
new policy introduced by government is a derivative of past policies. Each policy attempts to 
make reforms on past policies, avoid previous mistakes or utilize old policies as guidelines. 
Aboriginal governance policy has been rather unstable over the past three centuries. It often 
emerges in sporadic periods, usually surrounding Constitutional issues. Students of public policy 
may identify this behaviour as punctuated equilibrium—i.e., the stagnation of a policy until a 
crisis situation unexpectedly appears, but gradually levels out to a less serious tone as the target 
population learns to adapt. This description is only partially accurate. Many federal policies have 
emerged uncoordinated, spontaneous, and often contradictory. Consistently Aboriginal 
governance policy has remained a “collage of policies” rather than a constant policy framework 
with explicitly defined goals.
3
 More precisely Aboriginal governance policy has continuously 
shifted from assimilation to recognition back to assimilation. This will be exemplified in greater 
detail later in the paper. Additionally, numerous governance policies rely on the specifics 
established in the restrictive Indian Act which the government refuses to more than symbolically 
reform.
4
  
 The first policy adopted by the federal government was the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
This Act prohibited the occupation or sale of land specifically reserved for Indians without the 
direct consent of the Crown. It also stipulated that the Crown would maintain its protection over 
Indians from being disturbed by external governing bodies or citizens. Implicitly, no other agent, 
including the Governor or Commander in Chief of the time, can create or enforce laws on the 
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lands belonging to the allied Indians. The Royal Proclamation incorporated these requests from 
First Nations with every intention to implement them as a sign of their gratitude for the 
numerous Indian alliances formed with the British during the French-English Wars in North 
America.
5
 The Act would become the basis for the 1876 Indian Act. 
 With the creation of the Dominion of Canada many of the British Crown’s 
responsibilities over Indian policy were handed over to the new Canadian government. It was 
expected that the new government would continue to respect Indian lands, government and 
treaties. In 1876 the federal government instituted the Indian Act which was intended to provide 
greater protection from abuse and obtrusive settlers and to implement the obligations of treaties, 
royal instructions and the Royal Proclamation into federal law. Still, the federal government 
“increasingly took a broad view of being able to legislate for the ‘Indians’ on matters not 
delegated to it by the treaties”
6
 resulting in a distorted policy of assimilation. In several areas the 
Act does fulfill its protectionist objective but it simultaneously eradicates the independence of 
First Nations by introducing a significant role for the Governor-in-Council in Aboriginal affairs. 
The primary goal of this policy was not necessarily protection, but rather “to prepare [First 
Nations peoples] for a higher civilization by encouraging [them] to assume the privileges and 
responsibilities of full citizenship”.
7
 After a century and a half the federal government continues 
to maintain the same policy goal of assimilation by refusing to safeguard Aboriginal autonomy 
from external abuse and interference, and this will continue so long as the Indian Act remains 
unaltered. What is needed is revision. The complete annihilation of the Act is certainly not a 
prerequisite in the acquisition of Aboriginal self-government. In fact, it can have the reverse 
effect by accelerating the process of assimilation. This was the experience with the infamous 
1969 White Paper on Indian Policy.  
 Pierre Trudeau’s dreams for a just and equal society conflicted with First Nations’ 
treaties designed to preserve their uniqueness and special privileges bequeathed to them for 
centuries. Therefore his solution was to eliminate any precursor of difference within Canadian 
society including the Indian Act, which set First Nations apart from the rest of the Canadian 
populace. His goal, with the assistance from the Minister of Indian Affairs at the time—Jean 
Chrétien—was to integrate Indians into Canadian society so they could enjoy all the benefits of 
Canadian citizenship. The elimination of the Indian Act would end the distinction between status 
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and non-status Indians and disregard any previous treaties or legislation that identified 
Aboriginals’ right to self-government. The quick and unanticipated response from First Nations 
political organizations resulted in the termination of the policy.
8
 Although Pierre Trudeau 
continued to sustain his strong stance on individualism and equality, he interestingly enough 
recognized separate rights for First Nations in the Constitution Act of 1982. 
 The inclusion of Aboriginal governing rights was not necessarily a matter of choice for 
Trudeau. It was not until several Aboriginal organizations lobbied the Queen and British 
Parliament to cease the patriation process that such rights were considered. The adoption of 
sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 symbolized a significant step forward for 
Aboriginal self-government, because for the first time in Canadian history Aboriginal and treaty 
rights were entrenched in the constitution. Section 25 asserted that the newly adopted Charter of 
Rights cannot supersede Aboriginal treaty rights, and section 35 verifies the existence of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.
9
 Nevertheless, the Canadian government retained the view that 
these rights can be negotiated, as was evident during Mulroney’s endeavor to amend the 
constitution.  
 Aboriginal peoples question why negotiations must occur when they believe their needs 
are clearly outlined in treaties and the Constitution. Yet, the exclusion of Aboriginals in 
constitutional negotiations forced them to reconsider this thought. In the 1987-1990 Meech Lake 
Accord, discussions concentrated on improving the partnership between English and French 
Canada and ignored the historical role of Aboriginal peoples in building Canada. This omission 
was costly on the part of the federal government. Elijah Harper, an Aboriginal occupying a seat 
in the Manitoba legislature, objected to the idea of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society but 
not Aboriginals’ right to self-government. The delays Harper instigated resulted in the ultimate 
expiry of the Accord.
10
 The Mulroney government now had to ensure that Aboriginal self-
government issues would not be neglected.  
Thus, the following constitutional round in 1992 included Aboriginal political 
organizations and other groups of First Nation citizens in the discussions. The Charlottetown 
Accord would finally entrench Aboriginals’ inherent right to self-government in the Constitution 
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and establish a third order of government within Canadian federalism. This Accord would have 
radically altered the relationship between First Nation communities and the federal and 
provincial governments by readjusting the jurisdictions between governments. Unfortunately for 
all parties involved, the Accord failed in a nation-wide referendum, largely a result of its overall 
complexities.
11
  
Mulroney’s government had temporarily averted the federal government’s traditional 
policy of assimilation and concentrated more on transferring self-government powers to Indian 
governments. By way of constitutional talks, Mulroney recognized the need to devolve more 
spending powers to individual band governments. Appendix B reveals that between the years 
prior to 1987 constitutional discussions DIAND (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development) remained relatively consistent in maintaining control over Aboriginal programs. 
However, once constitutional discussions entered the government’s agenda DIAND decreased its 
role in directing funds to specific programs and gradually transferred this function to Aboriginal 
governments.  
To counteract the 1987 and 1990 Constitutional failings, the 1995 Inherent Right Policy 
was implemented to officially recognize Aboriginals’ right to self-government. In addition, the 
Penner Report of 1983 was re-evaluated on the basis of its suggestions that the only other 
possible alternative to alleviate the poverty and social conditions existent in Aboriginal 
communities was through the devolution of powers to Aboriginal peoples.
12
 Consequently, 
DIAND finally acted on these recommendations, in combination with the proposals provided by 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) Report, by applying the tools necessary 
for properly devolving powers to First Nations’ governments under the First Nations Governance 
Act (FNGA). 
The FNGA marks a new turn in the evolution of Aboriginal governance policy. Its sole 
directive is to expedite the process of autonomous First Nations’ governments by supplying the 
tools for effective self-government. It was first introduced in the House of Commons on June 14, 
2002 and re-instated October 9, 2002. Before a second reading could occur, the Chrétien 
government was replaced by Paul Martin’s new administration in 2004 which included a new 
Minister of DIAND. The Act was not re-introduced. However, while this policy was on the 
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government agenda Robert Nault, the Minister of DIAND prior to the change in administration, 
claimed that the Indian Act was the most constraining element to the progression of Indian self-
government. Therefore he avowed to amend the Act and develop a system where Indians can 
“choose their leaders” and “develop clear rules regarding how they spend their money”.
13
 The 
principal plan of the FNGA was to encourage nation-building, institutional change, participation 
in the Canadian economy, and build a new fiscal relationship between the federal government, 
Aboriginal governments and Aboriginal communities. The policy would be implemented 
through the imposition of codes. These codes compel First Nations’ governments to devise 
methods for leadership selection, administering band government, and instituting procedures for 
maintaining financial accountability. Band governments that fail to apply codes within a given 
two-year time frame will have their codes formulated by DIAND. Minister Robert Nault has 
continuously reiterated the fact that extensive consultation with Aboriginal communities had 
transpired before the Act was devised, and therefore he notes little reason for disrepute over its 
purpose and goals.
14
 However, significant discontent from Aboriginal communities inundated 
government officials shortly after its introduction.  
Many Aboriginal peoples view the FNGA as little more than an extension of the Indian 
Act. Not only does it expand the authority of the Minister within Aboriginal affairs, but it also 
dictates to Aboriginal communities how they must assemble and conduct their governments’ 
operations. The previous policy goal introduced by Mulroney during the Constitutional reform 
debates aimed at encouraging greater autonomy for Aboriginal governments and was now being 
rescinded. Instead the Ministry was returning to a policy of assimilation. The codes that 
Aboriginal governments were expected to implement resembled the institutional frameworks of 
Canadian governments as opposed to First Nations’ traditional governing practices. Moreover, 
the increased involvement of the Minister reduces the power and legitimacy of Aboriginal 
governments. In addition to assenting to band government codes, the Minister supervises the 
conditions in which money is allocated, “how it will be accounted for, and what systems will be 
put in place at the band level to achieve this accountability”.
15
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The FNGA signifies a shift in Aboriginal governance policy from the long-standing 
cultural assimilation that was evident with the establishment of residential schools, where 
Aboriginals were displaced from their families and raised in an environment that prohibited any 
practice of Indian culture, to a policy of institutional assimilation. Aboriginal systems of 
government are not only confronted with obstructions from the Indian Act, but they are now 
impeded by the FNGA since this recent policy is not intended to abolish the 129-year-old Act. 
The federal government is focused on eliminating the “administrative, political, legal and 
economic arrangements that set Indians apart from other Canadians”. The goal of the federal 
ministry is to make Indian governments equivalent to municipalities. This would involve the 
phasing out of DIAND which is viewed as an obstacle to institutional assimilation, since its 
existence or any other ministry similar to it is not in accordance with the standard municipal 
relations with provincial governments.
16
 However, unlike Canadian municipalities, Indian 
governments are deprived of their autonomy especially in relation to the delivery of programs to 
their communities.
17
 This also demonstrates the shift to greater institutional assimilation.  
In the period spanning Mulroney’s and Chrétien’s administrations, Aboriginal 
governance policy shifted noticeably. Appendix B validates that Aboriginal policy alternated 
from paternalism to devolution only to revert back to paternalism. Aboriginal governments 
encountered increased discretion over the direction of program funding until briefly after its peak 
in 1994 soon after the election of the Chrétien Liberal party. DIAND reasserted its paternalism in 
Aboriginal governing affairs, decreasing only slightly in 1996-1997 after the release of the 
Report by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Currently Aboriginal governance 
policy holds steady with Aboriginal governments possessing little discretion over the direction of 
programs while DIAND is again increasing its paternalistic role—most evident with the FNGA.  
 
II: Policy Actors 
By referring to the policy map in Appendix C it can be observed which actors are central to the 
policy process and the relation they have to each other. The evolution of the FNGA provides an 
adequate example of these actors’ involvement in Aboriginal governance policy. Two of the 
most salient actors are the Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Indian Affairs and 
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Northern Development (DIAND). Although the Prime Minister establishes the agenda for the 
Minister of DIAND, it is the Minister that coordinates the agenda of the PM. As was mentioned 
earlier the prominence of the Ministry often depends on the involvement of the PM in the 
department’s agenda. Mulroney was rather submissive on the issue of Aboriginal governance 
policy while Chrétien, due to his past track record as Minister of DIAND, remained engaged in 
the agenda of this policy area. Hence, during Mulroney’s tenure DIAND remained relatively 
subdued, but was more visible during Chrétien’s administration.  
Central agencies encounter two significant problems with the administration of 
Aboriginal governance policy that have a negative impact on the process. First, there are 
frequently numerous departments involved in different aspects of Aboriginal affairs, such as the 
Ministries of Justice, Labour, and Finance. The different interests of each department lead to 
conflicts that obstruct the successful implementation of policies and that contribute to the 
uncoordinated, ad hoc policies discussed earlier. This also increases the powers of the central 
agencies to referee the contradicting ideologies and interests.
18
 Second, consistent with all 
departments involved in some aspect of Aboriginal policy, few policy and program developers 
interact or have contact with Aboriginal peoples—their target population. The outcome is that 
policy-makers within these agencies and departments possess “little knowledge or 
understanding” of Aboriginal concerns.
19
 
 Similarly DIAND encounters a lack of understanding of Aboriginal concerns, but not to 
the same degree as other departments. Although some policy-makers may possess certain 
knowledge on Aboriginal issues, the direction of Aboriginal governance policy in this 
department can largely depend on the activist role of the Minister.
20
 Until DIAND was 
established in 1966, Ministers had remained relatively inactive in this portfolio or those 
portfolios that incorporated Indian Affairs. Once the Federal White Paper was introduced in 
1969, the subject of Indian Affairs became a significant aspect on the government’s agenda and 
increased the importance of the department and its Minister. Moreover, the concerns espoused by 
the rising Aboriginal political organizations, as a response to the White Paper, required greater 
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attention from the government and also attributed to the increasingly activist role of the Minister 
of DIAND. The origin of the FNGA is the result of Minister Robert Nault’s adamant pursuit in 
fulfilling the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. 
 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) was instituted by the federal 
government in August 1991 for two primary reasons: 1) to improve the relationship between the 
federal government and Aboriginals—a goal largely motivated by the adverse effects of the Oka 
Crisis, and 2) to provide an updated and extended version of the 1966 Hawthorn Report which 
advocated a “need for cultural revival…as a precursor to social rehabilitation and economic 
development”.
21
 The Commission discovered, through extensive consultations in 1992, the 
necessity for Aboriginal peoples to re-instate independent band governments and restructure the 
relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals.
22
 In 1996 the Commission released its 
long-overdue report to the House of Commons. Its key findings pertaining to Aboriginal self-
government include: renewing the partnership between the federal government and Aboriginals; 
strengthening Aboriginal governance by means of establishing a third order of government and 
dividing jurisdictions; developing a new fiscal relationship by reforming the method of transfer 
payments and financial accountability; federal recognition and execution of Aboriginal 
Treaties—new and old; and supporting strong communities, people and economics through the 
development of band autonomy from federal government initiatives and greater band legitimacy 
and accountability to communities.
23
 Numerous interest associations were contacted for feedback 
on this report; however RCAP’s negligence in consulting any of the prominent Aboriginal 
women’s organizations including the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) ignited a 
demand for greater inclusion in government policy.  
Since the late 1960s considerable attention has been dedicated to a variety of Aboriginal 
political organizations demanding increased involvement in discussions affecting their welfare. 
Combined with the introduction of the controversial White Paper in 1969, the initiation of 
federally funding for Aboriginal political organizations produced a significant increase in the 
numbers and exposure of these organizations. Moreover, the enfranchisement of Aboriginal 
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peoples almost a decade earlier rendered them a highly influential voting population.
24
 
Mobilization of Aboriginal peoples was no longer being impeded and they could now defend 
their interests effectively in the Canadian political and judicial arena. 
Currently there are five major national Aboriginal organizations: the Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN) established in 1982, the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) formed in 1970, 
the Inuit Tapiriiksat Kanatami (ITC) created in 1975-6, the Métis National Council (MNC) 
founded in 1982, and the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) established in 1974. 
This paper will concentrate on the role of the most influential of Aboriginal political 
organization—the Assembly of First Nations. The predecessor of the AFN was the National 
Indian Council followed by the National Indian Brotherhood. Each of these organizations failed 
due to consistent problems with fragmentation caused mainly by reluctant provincial and 
territorial leaders to relinquish their powers to a national body. The AFN increased the grassroots 
links and instilled greater power with the newly established positions of the national chief and 
forty-eight other executive members more formally known as the Confederacy of Nations. The 
conception of the AFN did not resolve all the initial problems existent in its predecessors. The 
lingering problem remained the AFN’s difficulty in maintaining a national consensus between 
Indian bands across the country—best demonstrated by the failure of the Charlottetown 
Accord.
25
 However, the introduction of the FNGA has successfully mobilized the AFN into a 
united front with the majority of Indian bands fixed on defeating this Bill. The AFN has become 
the most utilized source of consultation for the federal government, which inevitably assisted the 
Joint Ministerial Advisory Committee (JMAC) in devising the framework for the FNGA.  
On November 20, 2001 the JMAC held its first session and consisted of expert 
bureaucrats, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, knowledgeable on issues of Aboriginal 
governance. Its directive was influenced in part by RCAP’s recommendations and was instructed 
by the Minister of DIAND to establish a means in assisting Aboriginal band governments in 
becoming more accountable to their communities. Regrettably, the JMAC’s advice delivered in 
its final report on March 2, 2002 was not accurately implemented in the completed Act. The 
JMAC optimized for leadership selection tools, accountability and financial management 
measures, but also emphasized the necessity for band governments to be more institutionally 
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independent.
26
 Ultimately Robert Nault manipulated the report by ignoring the latter suggestion 
and instead increased the authority of the government in the establishment of the former 
recommendations. The high degree of Ministerial involvement in the selection of band leaders 
and enforcing band governments’ accountability diminishes the role of community members in 
these activities. In essence, the FNGA contradicts the department’s long-term policy goals by 
only offering band governments fabricated, self-defeating governing tools in contrast to 
promoting greater control over their own band governments. These concerns were soon noted 
once the Act was introduced in the House and the government referred it to the Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs before the second reading.  
Established on January 27, 2003, the Standing Committee would enable interested parties 
to voice their opinions on the FNGA and continue the deliberation between the federal 
government and Aboriginals. An additional purpose of the Committee was to provide an 
assessment on the legality and feasibility of the Act. The expert advice of the Auditor General of 
Canada, Sheila Fraser, provided statements to announce the impracticalities of the Act—the most 
outstanding was the notion that the Act failed to consider the size of different Aboriginal 
communities and therefore it is unreasonable to implement stringent criteria on smaller 
communities without the power or resources to do so. Furthermore, she notes that it is 
unreasonable to demand extensive reporting practices on smaller communities.
27
 Overall, the 
Standing Committee’s final evaluation urges the federal government to improve the 
accountability relationship between Aboriginal governments and their citizens by removing the 
wardship-type influence (control and compliance) exhibited in the federal government attitude.
28
 
Robert Nault’s relentless determination to implement the FNGA, regardless of the requested 
changes by other government actors and Aboriginal organizations, was finally put to an end with 
his removal from office during the Martin government. 
Aboriginal governance policy is influenced by minor, but nevertheless quite relevant, 
policy actors. Opposition members in the House are very cautious with the introduction of 
Aboriginal governance policy partly due to its contentious nature. Opposition leaders have the 
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ability to note the concerns of Aboriginals in the House that government leaders neglect to 
address thereby offering Aboriginals another alternative for redress. Joe Clark, Conservative MP, 
raised the issue that the Act was significantly flawed since it required numerous amendments,
29
 
while the New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton pressured Paul Martin, a leading Liberal MP 
at the time, to vote against the Bill.
30
 Layton’s request was fulfilled when the Bill was not re-
introduced under Martin’s government.  
Aboriginals also have an advantage with the Courts. In most instances court rulings 
favour Aboriginals and with that, “the scope of their governance capacities expands as the courts 
clarify treaty rights”.
31
 In regards to the FNGA, one First Nation group in particular, the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, has challenged the Act with great success. The 
government’s attempt to have the Federation’s claim dismissed has been rejected on two 
occasions.
32
 The provinces share the federal government’s apprehension of the judiciary’s 
involvement in Aboriginal affairs. The provinces’ primary concern is the potential for overlap in 
provincial jurisdiction ensuing in the division of resources between provinces and Aboriginal 
governments. This is already evident with economic and energy meetings being conducted 
involving the two orders of government,
33
 and the tendency for the provinces to ignore 
Aboriginal interests when conceding resource licences to third parties.
34
 At the same time, the 
provinces welcome Aboriginal self-government because it would reduce the off-loading of 
federal responsibilities on to the provinces in the area of Aboriginal affairs. Conflicts between 
the federal and provincial governments would be expected to subside when greater responsibility 
is transferred to band governments.
35
 
International actors such as Amnesty International and the United Nations (UN) are 
strong allies with Aboriginals when confronting the provincial and federal governments. Part of 
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the UN’s agenda is to “decolonize” by granting self-determination to peoples that were once 
subject to colonization. The UN has identified self-determination as a right, which has put 
significant pressure on the federal government to change its approach towards this issue.
36
 An 
explanation as to why the federal government does not alter its agenda of interference will be 
discussed in a moment, but first it can be observed that the prominence of these policy actors has 
changed since the 1990s. Aboriginal political organizations have increased their influence as the 
authority of the Minister of DIAND has alternated. Both international organizations and 
Parliamentarians are fully aware of the growing support from the public through public opinion 
polls on granting increased recognition of Aboriginal entitlements, including self-governing 
authority.
37
 Increasingly all Aboriginals,  rather than just select groups, have been encouraged to 
become more involved in government discussions relevant to their welfare.
38
 Under the new 
Martin regime, it is very likely that DIAND will gradually lose its importance again while 
Aboriginals acquire greater control over their own affairs. 
 
III: Problems Afflicting Aboriginal Governance Policy  
There are a variety of reasons that Aboriginal governance policy has remained relatively 
unsuccessful. The two most apparent reasons include: 1) the federal government choosing to 
maintain a practice of path dependency, and 2) First Nations and the Canadian governments 
possessing contrasting political philosophies. 
 
Path Dependency Theory 
The federal government began its long track record of paternalism with the institution of the 
Indian Act, and as we have observed this mind-set is evident in almost every policy following up 
to today. It is fitting to classify this behaviour as path dependency in which the government “has 
started down a track [and] the costs of reversal are very high”. Institutional arrangements 
obstruct an easy reversal of this behaviour making the costs of exit rise, hence reinforcing the 
process.
39
 In the case of Aboriginal self-government, the Constitution was what originally 
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constrained this policy. Now with the recognition of Aboriginals’ inherent right to self-
government in the 1995 Inherent Right Policy, this constraint has been eliminated. Nevertheless, 
the limitation of the division of powers poses a new restriction that Aboriginals must overcome 
in their quest for independence. Federal and provincial governments are unsupportive of 
constitutionally dividing jurisdictions any further with a third order of government. The 
Canadian governments’ path dependency can be characterized by three elements— inflexibility, 
nonergodicity, and potential path inefficiency.  
‘Inflexibility’ implies that “the farther into the process [one is], the harder it becomes to 
shift from one path to another”.
40
 In reference to the federal government, the entrenchment of 
assimilation within government policy over the past century has made it difficult to even 
distinguish what policies can be considered assimilationist. Therefore, without properly defining 
it or acknowledging it in policies, the government will continue to deny Indians self-government. 
‘Nonergodicity’ is where “accidental events early in a sequence do not cancel out…small events 
are remembered”.
41
 For example, the erosion of Aboriginal political culture enforced by the 
federal government (imprisonment of Aboriginal chiefs for practicing traditional methods of 
government in the early 20
th
 century) is remembered by Aboriginals especially when the memory 
is refreshed with the control the Minister has over leadership selection. Finally, ‘potential path 
inefficiency’ demonstrates that the long-standing practice eventually becomes permanent and 
would incur greater disadvantages for the target group than it would if it implemented an entirely 
new alternative.
42
 In essence, the sustained paternalism is more detrimental for Aboriginals than 
would be the cost of conceding greater autonomy to band governments. In regards to Aboriginal 
governance policy, history is crucial. Randall Hansen adds to the definition by stipulating that 
“path dependency is established only when it can be shown that policy change was considered 
and rejected for reasons that cannot be explained”.
43
 Reducing the authority and control of the 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs was frequently recommended, yet the government refused to 
make the appropriate modifications to the FNGA that would diminish the Minster’s role. 
The costs associated with the accommodation of Indian demands are considered high by 
the Canadian governments. The concept of Aboriginal nationhood challenges Canadian 
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sovereignty, and “territorial integrity”. According to the federal government’s philosophy, 
Aboriginal self-government will only stimulate other potential problems. The easiest solution is 
to uphold the course of “protection, civilization, and assimilation”.
44
  
 
Contrasting Political Thought 
The lack of understanding Aboriginals and the Canadian governments have towards each others’ 
political culture and ideologies is one of the most significant problems impeding the success of 
Aboriginal governance policy. This lack of understanding has resulted in competing visions over 
the direction of policy goals. However, since Aboriginals have been exposed to Canadian culture 
and political thought in large doses they tend to have a better grasp of Canadian culture than is 
true of Canadian governments with respect to Aboriginal culture. First Nations political culture is 
premised on the context of collectivities and an attachment to nature. Appendix D compares the 
opposing views on government, economics, property and basic values. It indicates that many of 
the Aboriginal ideologies are incompatible with Western practices. Consequently, this results in 
challenges to the Canadian governments. For instance, in order for Aboriginal communities to 
become developed and self-sustaining it is necessary for them to adopt Western thought 
including methods of governing. There seems to be a narrow outlook among Canadian 
governments that Western thought cannot be modified to accommodate Aboriginal political 
culture. But it has been confirmed that Aboriginal culture can be reformed to incorporate some 
aspects of Western culture at the same time as it is devoted to preserving its culture. The core of 
its identity is in the commitment to keep members and the community together over time.
45
 They 
are fighting a constant battle with the governments—while Aboriginals encourage members to 
remain in the community, governments persuade First Nations peoples to leave reserves and find 
employment in Canadian society. First Nations leaders believe that since governments have not 
been exposed to external threats on their sovereignty and identity in recent decades, they do not 
understand Aboriginal peoples’ position and therefore have the “natural tendency” to place First 
Nations’ governing rights on the side.
46
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 There are many other reasons behind the governments’ limited understanding of First 
Nations demands for greater autonomy—two of which depend on the government’s ideology, 
while another stems from the personalities of the leading politicians. Liberal democracy prevails 
in the basic ideology of government policies in Western society. Strongly accentuated during 
Trudeau’s government, liberal-democratic theory promotes individuality, equality, and freedom 
from discrimination. The notion of supplying programs on the basis of special status, collective 
rights and cultural uniqueness is contradictory with the government’s commitment to liberal 
democracy. Thus, to privilege First Nations with special rights to self-government becomes 
problematic.
47
 Moreover, Canadian policy-makers and politicians also misunderstand the 
concept of communitarianism, sharing of property and uniformity internal in First Nations’ 
cultures. Many still tend to believe Indians’ struggle to protect their traditional culture and 
government is futile since they have already absorbed so much Western culture over the 
centuries that their own culture has become diluted.
48
 The Indian Act is a perfect example of how 
Aboriginal political culture has absorbed Western political culture. It will not matter how much 
Aboriginals attempt to rectify their traditional forms of government, because the Act is engrained 
to such an extent in current Aboriginal governing systems that the precise operation of their 
original governments has been forgotten. This is considered a misconception by Aboriginal 
peoples. It is often a reality for smaller band governments that do not have the appropriate 
resources to make a partial transition back to their original governments, but for larger Indian 
governments—with the proper resources—the conversion is much more possible. 
 Increasingly, since the 1970s, government administrators or policy-makers that have the 
understanding and knowledge of Aboriginal political culture are declining in numbers. Individual 
ministers lack the skills to respond to Aboriginal demands for self-government and without the 
appropriate public-servant activists who can promote, facilitate and “translate [First Nations’] 
demands into policy forms acceptable to cabinet”, the government will remain ignorant of the 
needs of Aboriginals.
49
  
 Even with public-servant activists present in government their endeavors may be in vain. 
The government’s overall ideology and progress on Aboriginal governance policy is heavily 
dependent on the personality and ideals of the government leader. During Chrétien’s tenure as 
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Minister of Aboriginal Affairs under Trudeau’s administration, he was enthusiastic with the 
governments’ agenda to dismantle the Indian Act, which was evident in his construction of the 
1969 White Paper. His involvement in the Ministry was not abated throughout his tenure as 
Prime Minister. Chrétien’s strong support over the FNGA in the House is evidence of this, and it 
raises questions on whether he truly instigated the policy.
50
 Nevertheless, the new Prime 
Minister, Paul Martin, will determine the course of the FNGA. Martin approaches Aboriginal 
governance issues much more passively and with greater caution than his predecessor. This may 
be in part due to his lack in experience and knowledge on the issue. According to Martin, he is 
unsupportive of the Bill and promises that the Bill will not be re-introduced in the House.
51
 As of 
today, he continues to fulfill that promise; however, he has moved one step further by replacing 
the aggressive Robert Nault with more passive Ministers of DIAND, such as Andy Mitchell and 
Andy Scott. The direction of Aboriginal governance policy also reflects the perception of 
Aboriginal leaders. Matthew Coon Come, previous Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, is a 
strong opponent of the FNGA and refused to make any concessions to have the Bill passed in the 
Legislature. However, the current Chief, Phil Fontaine, raised anxious questions from some 
Aboriginal communities because he had such a strong stance on negotiating the Bill and was not 
outright hostile to its survival.
52
 The cultural values and modes of thinking have a noticeable 
impact on the differences in policy goals for both First Nations and Canadian governments. 
 The prime policy objective for First Nations leaders is to extinguish band councils as an 
“administrative arm” for DIAND, and instead accentuate their self-governing capacities through 
greater law-making and law-enforcing powers. They reject the institution of governing methods 
that resemble existing Canadian systems of government, especially the imposed municipal 
system. First Nations leaders are seeking to define exactly what form of self-government is 
necessary to suit the needs of First Nations peoples thereby providing a clear vision and 
legitimacy for community members and the Canadian governments to appreciate.
53
 Aboriginal 
peoples share common interests that are projected in their goals—to preserve the “shared 
historical memories, elements of common culture, ties to specific territory, and a sense of 
solidarity”—all of which cannot be achieved without significantly enhancing communal power 
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through self-government and removing external domination and constraints.
54
 In relation to this, 
Indian self-government can enforce limits on extensive commercialization and advertisements 
that endanger their culture. Federal government policy encourages commercial and industrial 
development in Aboriginal communities; however, the government fails to realize how this can 
have harmful implications on First Nations peoples. This is not to suggest that Aboriginals 
oppose economic development; rather, they are prudent with the choice of industry that will 
welcome in their communities.
55
 The disparity between Aboriginals and the federal government 
in the area of economic development is but one example of contrasting policy goals. Another 
example is the differing views over the treaty process noted in Appendix E. First Nations’ long-
standing concept of treaties involves an enduring relationship between the two parties involved 
that requires periodic renewals. Canadian governments interpret treaties as a contract that can be 
circumvented by constructing a newly reformed treaty. Although the federal government’s 
intentions may be constructive, the underlying results of their actions in Aboriginal governing 
affairs are frequently not in the interests of First Nations. 
 The federal government’s policy goals recurrently counter the objectives of First Nations, 
especially in recent years. Gradually, since the mid-1990s, the federal government has shifted 
from an agenda of social-justice to one of economic concern.
56
 Less attention and funding is 
allotted to First Nations issues due to economic restraint and their concerns are dealt with in the 
most efficient manner for the federal government (but certainly not the best manner). This is 
evident in Appendix B. Four other policy paradigms emerge in federal Aboriginal governance 
policies that are noted by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. First, the federal 
government maintains the subtle yet distinct assimilationist position treating Aboriginal societies 
similar to those of regular Canadian citizens. Second, the ‘citizens plus’ perspective entails that 
the direct descendents of treaty signatories possess special rights as a result of their status; in 
addition to ascertaining the rights of regular citizens. Third, the rights-based approach entitles all 
Aboriginals in Canada (including non-status, Inuit and Métis) to universal rights as an expression 
of their “aboriginality”. Fourth, is the sovereigntist paradigm in which First Nations are viewed 
as separate nations that require diplomatic relations between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals. 
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RCAP identifies that these paradigms, which are manifest in all federal government Aboriginal 
governance policy, are incoherent and contradicting.
57
 These paradigms are essentially the policy 
guidelines the federal department has adhered to for decades and lack the creativity to devise 
new policy categories to deal with Aboriginal governing affairs. Employing two or more of these 
paradigms within the same policy (such as the assimilationist and sovereigntist paradigm) create 
inconsistencies that, among other things, cause inefficiency and the continued exclusion of 
Aboriginal peoples in the development of this policy area.  
A further demonstration of the federal government’s differing priorities is its reliance on 
the 1995 Inherent Right policy. This policy concentrates to a large extent on municipal and 
provincial responsibilities as the foundation of self-government and denies First Nations 
governments any federal responsibilities that pertain to their welfare (note Appendix A).
58
 Many 
Indian leaders fear the federal government’s association of Indian self-government with 
municipal government, and these leaders refuse to accept imitations of Canadian institutions as 
their form of government.
59
 It is quite clear that the political culture of First Nations leaders and 
Canadian policy-makers strongly affects the policy goals of each party. Thus, to rectify these 
disparities and promote understanding it is imperative that First Nations peoples influence the 
policy direction of programs concerning their interests. 
 
IV: Improving the Role of First Nations in Policy Making 
Three promising solutions for successful Aboriginal governance policy are better consultation, 
greater representation for First Nations peoples, and, most importantly, treaty federalism. 
 
Consultation 
Presently the consultation process between First Nations peoples and the Canadian government 
is seriously flawed. It is well documented that proper consultation with Aboriginals is necessary 
to make adequate policy, yet little has been done to improve the process. The same nuances that 
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existed twenty years ago continue today. In a DIAND backgrounder report dated June 1984 it 
states: 
 In the fall of 1982 the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development put 
forward discussion papers which outlined a devolutionary approach to self-government, 
based on the existing system of Band Governments. This approach was criticized partly 
for its content and thrust, but also for the perceived lack of formal consultation with 
Indian people (emphasis added).
60
 
 
A substantial part of the problem with consultation is that the government has failed to devise an 
appropriate mechanism for consultations. A method of joint decision-making between 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals must be conducted. Few policy-makers, as has been observed 
earlier, do not possess the field experience to understand their target population, making it 
difficult to design programs that properly address Aboriginals’ needs. Concurrently, it is 
insulting to regard First Nations as a target population who are unable to contribute meaningful 
insights in this policy area.
61
 It denotes an identity of being objects rather than subjects in the 
discussion of public policy.
62
 Involving First Nations peoples in the most integral aspect of the 
policy process—problem definition or identifying the policy goals—can help alleviate this 
problem. Often policy makers in the federal government evade input from Aboriginals when 
formulating potentially new policy.
63
 Hindering consultation at the first stage of the policy 
process allows government officials to push their agenda on Aboriginal leaders and simply 
reserve the following stages for consultation. Meanwhile, First Nation leaders lack any 
opportunity to shape the policy from the beginning, help establish government priorities or make 
significant changes without reversing the policy. Consultation between stages, but not at the 
start, is considered a strategic method for legitimizing the policy process.  
 The FNGA encountered similar predicaments. Very little consultation occurred prior to 
the introduction of the Bill, except in regards to the discussions that ensued during the JMAC. 
However, the design of the Act failed to involve First Nations leaders or their political 
organizations directly. Instead, government officials approached organizations representing 
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groups, such as the Métis and non-status peoples, that have no vested interest in the changes this 
Act would have on the Indian Act.
64
 The government boasted about the numerous methods for 
consultation—community meetings, information sessions, discussion groups, toll-free numbers, 
and the website (e-mail).
65
 What the government tended to ignore was that many of the 
community meetings were short of attendance. Also, out of more than 600 First Nations 
communities, only 200 were consulted. Overall, only 3% of First Nations citizens requesting to 
participate in the consultations were permitted—a number that Robert Nault believes was an 
accomplishment.
66
 Fortunately, progress on a general scale has been positive in the direction of 
increased consultation. Intergovernmental meetings involving the direct participation of 
Aboriginal leaders are becoming more prevalent. Approximately three years ago, there were 
virtually no such conferences, and now several take place annually. Further advancement would 
be made with Aboriginal inclusion in the Annual Premiers’ Conferences.
67
 Improving the 
methods of consultation is only part of the problem. Remedying the lack of representation among 
Aboriginals in the federal government and the policy process will enhance Aboriginal 
governance policy considerably. 
 
Representation  
Some scholars argue that increased Aboriginal political representation within Canadian 
institutions is highly beneficial for First Nations to influence the policy process. Others disagree. 
Until 1960 Aboriginals were excluded from enfranchisement resulting in years of ignorance of 
Canadian political, social, and legal institutions. Hence, Aboriginal political organizations 
developed to offset the insufficient number of Aboriginal members in the federal and provincial 
legislatures. At present, there remains little influence from sitting Aboriginal members on the 
issues of Aboriginal governance policy. It has been suggested that a specific number of seats 
should be designated for Aboriginal members, which has been attempted in countries like New 
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Zealand.
68
 Increasing the number of reserved seats will also provide more opportunities for the 
government to establish special committees on Aboriginal governance issues that are managed 
by Aboriginals. So far the only progress the government has made in this direction is anointing 
MP/MPPs who have constituencies heavily populated by Aboriginal peoples. Frequently, but not 
always, this small group has ample knowledge on Aboriginal issues.
69
 
 It is argued that the lack in representation of Aboriginals in Canadian legislatures is not 
solely attributed to their ignorance of the system or to their failure in being elected. Many 
Aboriginals maintain the long-standing view that any participation in the Canadian political 
system implies consent to political assimilation. Canadians and policy-makers alike may 
perceive that sufficient representation of Aboriginals in the Canadian government diminishes the 
need for Aboriginal self-government, lessening the pressure felt from First Nations political 
organizations. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that once Aboriginals who are elected to office will 
have the capacity to influence policy due, in large part, to party discipline.
70
 Since representation 
is neither effective nor beneficial for improving First Nations in policy-making the only possible 
alternative is an entirely different approach. 
 
Treaty Federalism 
Canada has not yet detached itself from being identified as a colonial state. The government 
consistently denies a significant and growing portion of its population from governing itself—
evident in the lack of representation in Canadian institutions. Regardless of court decisions 
recognizing Aboriginal and treaty rights as constitutionally supreme law under sections 25 and 
35 of the Constitution Act 1982, politicians and policy-makers fail to recognize these resolutions. 
In Canada, the fact remains—treaty and Aboriginal rights are still viewed as inferior to 
constitutional rights.
71
 Moreover, they continue to ignore the basic principle of the rule of law: 
”that all peoples, despite race or ethnicity, are to be secure in what the Crown has recognized as 
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their liberties and entitlements”.
72
 First Nations by no means have had their sovereign status 
legally removed at any time throughout pre or post Confederation.
73
  
According to James Youngblood Henderson, the most appropriate solution for rectifying 
this negative persona is to enforce treaty obligations. These treaty obligations were first 
negotiated for the purpose of sharing Indian land and resources with settlers. In addition, they 
defined the nature of the Aboriginal and British government’s relationship and specified that by 
sovereign right the Crown or agents of the Crown have the authority to deal with some 
administrative matters while First Nations “retain legal and governmental authority”.
74
 Any 
Aboriginal right not delegated to the Crown is absolved to First Nations. Many Canadians of 
European descent adopt the notion that First Nations peoples are a conquered people and that 
their predicaments are a product of war and refusal to assimilate with Europeans in post 
confederation. However, these outstanding beliefs are irrational when such familiar treaties as 
those leading to the Royal Proclamation 1763 and ‘Numbered Treaties’ (which can only be 
established by two self-governing nations) outline each nations jurisdictions and system of 
coexistence. It is incredibly puzzling why First Nations peoples are no longer treated as equals. 
As Canada’s first founding peoples, First Nations fought to defend the Crown, its colonists and 
land from invaders, assist in the institution of federalism in Canada,
75
 and First Nations’ treaties 
first pioneered a system of equalization formulas that are now familiar in Canadian federalism. 
The negotiation of supplements and compensation for the loss of land and governing autonomy 
were the basis for these payments.
76
 Other terms of the treaty federalism asserted: 1) protection 
of Aboriginal rights, 2) distribution of shared jurisdictions, 3) territorial management, 4) 
promotion of human liberties and rights, and 5) instituting treaty delegations.
77
 Andrew Bear 
Robe argues that the initial conduct over land treaties can be applied to the sharing of 
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sovereignty.
78
 Just as lands and resources were divided between Aboriginals and Europeans 
through treaties, jurisdictions can be shared and divided by the same method. 
There is a misperception that treaty federalism is equated with a third order of 
government within Canada. Rather, treaty federalism advocates for equal status with the 
provinces where First Nations share a similar relationship with the federal government as do the 
provinces. It also infers that First Nations manage equivalent jurisdictions as the provinces albeit 
within their own territorial boundaries. Treaty federalism does not imply the disruption of the 
existing division of powers delineated in the Canadian Constitution, more accurately “each 
jurisdiction maintains their own”.
79
 This arrangement strictly necessitates each province to 
refrain from intervening in First Nations’ governing and punitive affairs and act intra vires.  
Although Indian Affairs is a federal matter, it progressively surrendered responsibility 
over Aboriginal land to the provinces as well as imposing provincial laws on reserves. 
Accompanying these actions, confusion ensued over which governments were fiscally 
responsible for First Nations’ monetary policy creating fiscal battles between governments.
80
 
Implementing the treaty orders will quickly resolve this dilemma by clearly defining the 
jurisdictions and maintaining the historical relationship with the Crown and federal 
government—not directly with the provinces. As Henderson explains, Aboriginals “are the only 
peoples that the federal government has an exclusive and continuing constitutional obligation to 
serve, while the provinces serve the colonialists”.
81
 According to the Sparrow decision, the 
courts declared the Aboriginals are constitutionally protected from provincial interference in 
First Nations affairs.  
Reexamining Appendix A, we can compare the jurisdictions of the Siksika First Nation
82
 
and the responsibilities required to properly function as a self-governing society. Their actions 
can formulate an example for other First Nations to proceed in achieving control over their own 
destiny. Under the Siksika’s proposed arrangements they will have full control over: 
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Source: Andrew Bear Robe, ‘Treaty Federalism—A Concept for the Entry of First Nations into the Canadian 
Federation and Commentary on the Canadian Unity Proposals’, (Gleichen, AB: Andrew Bear Robe and Siksika 
Indian Government Division), Apr. 30, 1992. Final Version, p. 27. 
 
We can observe that these responsibilities are consistent with provincial powers and are the 
essential building blocks for any society to function. The Sisksika Nation has become a positive 
example for First Nations by demonstrating that Aboriginal peoples can successfully accomplish 
and maintain self-government. Furthermore, the recognition of First Nations’ jurisdictions will 
eliminate the offensive position of subordination and be perceived as equal partners in 
confederation. 
 In essence, treaty federalism facilitates guidelines on how Aboriginal governance policy 
should be addressed and outlines the roles of particular actors in the process of Aboriginal 
governance policy; thus detailing the relationship between the federal government and First 
Nations. Implementing treaty federalism will unquestionably help but not completely resolve all 
of Aboriginals’ tribulations. Nevertheless, it is a significant step forward for rectifying repeated 
past wrongs on First Nations peoples. It will initiate greater responsibility and allow Aboriginals 
to develop policy that best suits their cultural distinctness. It is still crucial for the federal 
government to devise new Aboriginal governing policy since it is clearly stated in treaties 
exactly how the government should proceed: principally, that the government should refrain 
from interfering in First Nations’ affairs. Moreover, Aboriginals can establish their own policies 
(together with reaffirming their self-government practices) in accordance with their treaties.  
 
Conclusion 
Aboriginal governance policy may take an interesting turn with the new government in office. 
Paul Martin has little affiliation with DIAND so this could be viewed as positive or as a potential 
problem—positive in the sense that more consultation and devolution of powers to band 
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• Election code and procedures 
• Health  
• Social services and child welfare 
• Education 
• Financial powers, accountability 
and fiscal arrangements 
• Administration of justice 
• Land title, land use and land 
management 
• Renewable and non-renewable 
resources 
• Environment 
• Water 
• Public works and undertakings 
• Language, heritage and culture 
• Local trade and commerce 
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governments may be feasible or problematic in reference to Aboriginal governing affairs being 
on the list of low priorities. Throughout this policy’s history, the direction of Aboriginal 
governance policy alternates between these two views. Most of its history is problematic. Since 
the Royal Proclamation there have been shifts between devolution of responsibilities to 
Aboriginals, to paternalism with the Indian Act, a return to devolution with the entrenchment of 
Aboriginal rights in the 1982 Constitution Act, and then back to paternalism with the recent First 
Nations Governance Act. Frequently the shifts are attributed to the leaders that are in office at 
the time. Pierre Trudeau voluntarily followed a paternalistic approach, while Mulroney 
relinquished authority to First Nations. Chrétien resumed Trudeau’s agenda of paternalism. 
 An increasing demand for recognition of particular governing rights by Aboriginal 
political organizations attracted attention from several different policy actors. Almost all policy 
actors involved in the policy process advocate for greater self-governing powers for First Nations 
and less interference from the federal government in their affairs. Consistently the Liberal 
government has ignored many of these requests and continues the path of paternalism and 
assimilation. 
 Why the government maintains this role is a matter of contrasting political thought. The 
practice of Canadian liberal democracy is unsupportive of Aboriginal special rights and 
misunderstands the precepts to First Nation political culture. In addition, recognition and reversal 
of previous assimilationist policies may be costly to the government and so politicians and 
policy-makers follow the path they are most comfortable with regardless of its implications on 
First Nations peoples; a clear example of path dependency theory. This route will persist unless 
more knowledgeable public servants are available to defend or influence Aboriginal governance 
policy. 
 To offset the depletion of expert public servants in the area of Aboriginal governance 
policy, greater consultation is required between First Nations leaders and the Canadian 
governments. Inclusion of First Nations in the development of public policy by means of 
problem definition and setting goals is crucial. Governments do not necessarily have the best 
interests of First Nations in mind or understand their target population when developing policies 
and require Aboriginals’ input from the outset. There has fortunately been a positive movement 
towards increased consultation, yet significant defects linger in recent policies, like the FNGA, 
that have remained unchanged. It is questionable whether greater representation within Canadian 
institutions will compensate for the lack of consultation. Some scholars argue that there is a lack 
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of representation for Aboriginals to influence policy; others insist that the less representation in 
Canadian institutions is for the better. The latter group believes participation in ‘foreign’ 
institutions is a method of consenting to assimilation, but also it decreases the influence of First 
Nations political organizations. The widely supported solution to Aboriginal governance policy 
is to implement treaty federalism. All policy formation and proceedings will be derived from 
treaties and assist band governments to re-instate their overdue governing powers.  
 Predictions over the path of Aboriginal governance policy are blurred at best. What can 
be seen in the future is that greater attention will be bestowed on Aboriginal self-government as a 
solution to the poor social and economic conditions ubiquitous in First Nations communities. In 
time, with the expectation of several more controversial policies, Aboriginals will finally succeed 
in developing their own independent policies within their own fully autonomous government 
institutions. 
 
  28 
 
Appendix A: 
Aboriginal Jurisdictions 
Source: J. Kaufman and F. Roberge, Aboriginal Governance in the Canadian Federal State 2015, (Kingston: 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper 2003), p. 53. 
 
 
Appendix B: 
First Nations Governments’ Level of Financial Autonomy 
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Appendix C: 
Policy Map and Relationship between Policy Actors 
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Appendix D: 
Divergent Political Cultures 
 
 
Source: Unkown 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurocentric Aboriginal 
Money as “capital” Nature as “capital” 
Democratic or autocratic decision-making Consensus decision-making 
Alienation from the process of government 
on a day-to-day level 
Active participation in the process of 
government on a day-to-day level 
Power concentrated in the hands of a few Power broadly based 
Strong ethic of direct leadership Strong ethic of collective leadership 
Work emphasizes material gain Work emphasizes spiritual gain 
Individual ownership Collective ownership 
Ethic of competition Ethic of cooperation 
Work-related stresses Stress associated with external variables 
Land/means of production can be owned 
individually 
Land/means of production are held 
collectively 
Legal titles and deeds can be held 
individually 
No such concept 
Land belongs to “us” “we” belong to the land 
Success measured by accumulation 
economic 
Success measured by peer review 
Profound belief that economic change can 
be imposed from an outside society 
Profound belief that economic change can 
only be accomplished from within society 
Ethic of individualism Ethic of “kin-ism” 
Permanent institutions Fluidity of institutions  
Deviance is punished by confinement 
within society 
Deviance is punished by exile from society 
Problems are isolated away from society in 
general 
Problems are dealt with at a community 
level 
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Appendix E:  
Competing Visions of the Treaty Process 
 
 Federal and Provincial 
Governments 
First Nations 
Status and Relationship of 
the Parties 
Representatives of the 
Crown meeting with 
minorities within Canada 
Equal peoples and 
governments in status, 
nation to nation 
Purposes of Treaty Process To define and enumerate 
rights and protect them 
under the Constitution 
To bring certainty to all 
parties and some 
compensation and 
capacity-building to First 
Nations 
To work out relations of 
mutual understanding of 
identities and mutual 
sharing of powers, land 
and resources among 
equals 
Scope and Nature of 
Treaties as Documents 
Treaties are large, once-
and-for-all agreements 
dealing with matters of 
jurisdictions, authorities 
and governance 
Treaties are specific, short 
term, and renewable 
agreements aimed at 
specific problems 
Intended Results A full and final settlement 
of outstanding claims, 
obligations, and rights. 
An on-going/continuous 
process of cross-cultural 
dialogue and review and 
adjustments of treaties. 
 
Source: Frances Abele & Michael J. Prince, Aboriginal Governance and Canadian Federalism: A To-Do List for 
Canada, in Rocher & Smith (ed) New Trends in Canadian Federalism (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003), p. 
151. 
 
